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Abstract 
One of the core functions of explanation is to support prediction and generalization. However, 
some explanations license a broader range of predictions than others. For instance, an 
explanation about biology could be presented as applying to a specific case (e.g., “this bear”) or 
more generally across “all animals.” The current study investigated how 5- to 7-year-olds 
(N=36), 11- to 13-year-olds (N=34), and adults (N=79) evaluate explanations at varying levels 
of generality in biology and physics. Findings revealed that even the youngest children preferred 
general explanations in biology. However, only older children and adults preferred explanation 
generality in physics. Findings are discussed in light of differences in our intuitions about 
biological and physical principles. 
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Explanations for scientific phenomena are often considered superior when they are more 
general. Indeed, science might be described as extrapolating from individual cases to the most 
general claims possible. Similarly, in everyday life, seeking explanation generality can be 
beneficial (Lombrozo, 2012): General explanations group together similar instances, thereby 
reducing focus on the idiosyncrasies of each case and highlighting the shared factors that are 
most relevant (e.g., Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1981; Strevens, 2009; Williams & Lombrozo, 
2010). More broadly, general explanations offer a framework for drawing inferences across 
many circumstances, as they apply to a wide range of cases (Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002). 
Thus, an explanation that pertains across all members of a category (e.g., all bears) licenses a 
wider range of predictions about new cases than an explanation that only pertains to one 
particular member of a category (e.g., this bear).  
In some circumstances, even young children understand the utility of explanations that 
provide the basis for a wider range of predictions. Most notably, children as young as 5 prefer 
explanations that account for a greater number of observed outcomes. For instance, when 
watching an animal undergo a series of magical changes (e.g., a pig that grows whiskers on its 
face and stripes on its ears), 5- to 8-year-olds prefer broad explanations that account for both 
observed outcomes over narrow explanations that only account for only one observed outcome 
(Johnston, Johnson, Koven, & Keil, 2016). Likewise, when witnessing a set of reactions in a 
chemistry experiment, 7- to 11-year-olds prefer broad explanations that account for the full set of 
observed reactions over narrow explanations that only account for some of the observed 
reactions (Samarapungavan, 1992). Thus, when evaluating explanations for a specific set of 
observations, children seek explanatory breadth, preferring explanations that account for as many 
observations as possible. 
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However, a preference for explanatory breadth does not necessarily translate into a 
preference for explanation generality. To evaluate explanatory breadth, children need only 
consider the specific set of outcomes concerning a particular individual (e.g., whether this pig 
grew whiskers and stripes). In contrast, to evaluate explanation generality, children need to 
expand their scope beyond the current set of outcomes to consider how the explanation applies 
across an entire category (e.g., all pigs or all animals). Given this distinction between breadth 
and generality, prior work does not directly address the issue of whether children would prefer 
more general explanations; however, it does provide some suggestive hints. 
First, when producing explanations for statements of varying levels of generality, 
children demonstrate distinct intuitions about the implications of specific, token level statements 
(e.g., “This snake has holes in its teeth”) and more general generic statements (e.g., “Snakes have 
holes in their teeth;” Cimpian & Markman, 2009). Thus, when asked to explain features of 
different animals (e.g., “Why does this snake have holes in its teeth?”), 4- and 5-year-olds who 
are prompted with generic statements (rather than token-level statements) are (a) more likely to 
explain the features in terms of conceptually-central causes (e.g., “to drink the blood out of 
predators”) and (b) less likely to explain them in terms of prior events (e.g., “maybe yesterday he 
got poked in the teeth”; Cimpian & Markman, 2009). Similarly, when explaining features of 
novel artifacts (e.g., “Why is this dunkel sticky?”), 5-year-olds (but not 4-year-olds) are more 
likely to explain the features in terms of their functionality when hearing generic statements than 
token level statements (Cimpian & Cadena, 2010). These findings suggest that even young 
children expect that, compared to statements about a specific token, generic statements provide 
more conceptually central information about a general category. Given that children expect that 
generic statements provide more conceptually central information than token level statements, 
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they may prefer generic explanations (which clarify that information is conceptually central to an 
entire category) more than token level explanations (which imply that information is 
idiosyncratic and unique to a particular token). 
Second, and most crucially for the current study, children expect that generic information 
will extend more widely than token level information. Even 2-year-olds, when introduced to a 
novel property, are more likely to infer that the property extends to other category members 
when learning from generic language (e.g., “Blicks drink milk”) than specific, token level 
language (e.g., “This blick drinks milk;” Graham, Nayer, & Gelman, 2011; see also, Chambers, 
Graham, & Turner, 2008). In fact, by age 4, children are sensitive to even more nuanced 
distinctions in the relation between language and scope, inferring that universally quantified 
noun phrases (e.g., “All bears”) extend more widely than generics (e.g., “Bears;” Brandone, 
Gelman, & Hedglen, 2015; Gelman, Leslie, Was, & Koch, 2015; Gelman et al., 2002; Hollander, 
Gelman, & Star, 2002). Thus, by age 4, children have robust expectations that generic statements 
and universally quantified noun phrases apply more widely across category members than 
specific, token level statements. 
Given that children understand that universally quantified noun phrases apply more 
widely across categories than token level statements, might children also prefer universally 
quantified noun phrases as explanations, since they more efficiently explain a wider scope of 
phenomena in just one explanation? The current study aims to address this question by testing 
whether children prefer explanations that apply widely across categories (e.g., explanations about 
“all bears”) or more specifically to a particular token level case (e.g., explanations that apply to 
“this bear”). To do this, we examine whether children prefer explanations that explain an event 
about a particular token (e.g., this bear) in terms of an explanation at the token level (e.g., “this 
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bear”), the basic level (e.g., “all bears”), or the superordinate level (e.g., “all animals”). If 
children’s preference for explanatory breadth (Johnston et al., 2016; Samarapungaven, 1992) 
translates into a more abstract notion of scope that extends across an entire category, then 
children should consistently prefer the most general explanations presented (e.g., about “all 
animals”). In contrast, if children’s preference for wider scope in explanations is restricted to 
more concrete, token exemplars, then children may not demonstrate a preference for explanation 
generality, and may instead demonstrate a preference for specificity (e.g., explanations about 
“this bear”), or no preference at all. Alternatively, children may show a different preference 
entirely – for basic level explanations. Prior work has shown that from preschool to adulthood, 
there is a bias to remember (Gülgöz & Gelman, 2015), learn about (Mervis & Crisafi, 1982; 
Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976), and generalize to (Gelman & Reilly, 
1988) basic level categories. If this bias towards the basic level extends to explanation as well, 
then we should find evidence that children prefer basic level explanations more than either token 
level or superordinate explanations.  
In addition to exploring children’s explanatory preferences across these three levels (i.e., 
token, basic, and superordinate), we also explore their preferences across two domains—biology 
and physics. The principles in these domains (e.g., respiration vs. gravity) and the typical targets 
(e.g., bears vs. hammers) have psychologically important distinctions. 
Biological kinds, particularly animals, are in large part defined by a shared set of 
underlying biological principles (e.g., respiration, digestion, etc.). Even 3- and 4-year-olds 
recognize the presence of these shared biological principles and readily extend information about 
one animal (e.g., that a particular bug breathes in air) to other individuals of the same kind (e.g., 
Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987). In other words, 3- and 4-year-olds infer that a biological trait 
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one animal possesses will be shared across other animals of that kind. This early awareness that 
animal kinds share a set of underlying biological principles may help young children recognize 
the utility of general explanations, which allow for prediction across all members of a kind. 
In contrast, although there are general principles of physics that apply to all things (e.g., 
gravity), physical kinds, especially human-made artifact kinds, are primarily defined by 
differences in how they function, rather than a shared set of underlying physical principles. Even 
young children understand that artifact kinds are less predictive than animal kinds. Not only are 
young children less likely to provide generic statements for artifact kinds (e.g., hammers) than 
animal kinds (e.g., bears; Brandone & Gelman, 2013), but they also are less likely to assume that 
information about one member of an artifact kind will extend to another member of the same 
kind (Gelman, 1988). Thus, in order for children to appreciate the utility of explanation 
generality in physics, they cannot rely on their expectations about the predictive nature of artifact 
kinds. Instead, children need to understand the utility of explanations that invoke general 
principles (e.g., gravity), which apply broadly across individual objects. Given that children 
cannot rely on the predictive nature of artifact kinds in the physical domain, they may fail to 
recognize the utility of explanation generality in physics until later development. 
We investigated these preferences for explanation generality in biology and physics 
across three age groups: 5- to 7-year-olds, 11- to 13-year-olds, and adults. Five- to 7-year-olds 
clearly differentiate between specific and generic language (e.g., Cimpian & Cadena, 2010; 
Gelman et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2011), show reliable explanatory preferences (particularly for 
explanatory breadth; Johnston et al., 2016; Samarapungaven, 1992), and conceptualize animal 
and artifact categories differently (e.g., Gelman, 1988; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), making them 
an appropriate younger age group for the current investigation. However, given that some 
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research has shown that children do not begin to show adult-like explanatory preferences until 
age 11 (Samarapungaven, 1992), we also included a group of 11- to 13-year-olds and a group of 
adults in our sample. 
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-six 5- to 7-year-olds (MAge = 6 years 8 months; range = 4 years 12 months - 7 
years 12 months; 9 5-year-olds, 11 6-year-olds, 16 7-year-olds; 21 females), 34 11- to 13-year-
olds (MAge = 12 years 1 month; range = 10 years 8 months to 13 years 12 months; 19 11-year-
olds, 8 12-year-olds, 7 13-year-olds; 21 females), and 79 adults (recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk) participated in the study, conducted from June to October 2014. The children 
were recruited from our lab database and a local science museum in a Northeastern metropolitan 
area with a median income of $62,000. The region’s population distribution is as follows: 79% 
White, 14% Black, 4% Asian, and 3% other races, with approximately 17% identifying as 
Hispanic. 
Design and Procedure 
 For each domain, we developed explanations for nine phenomena that were broadly 
applicable to either all animals or all things. For biology, we developed explanations for 
circulation, digestion, hydration, immunity, inheritance, movement, respiration, sight, and waste. 
For physics, we developed explanations for atomic structure, color, decay, displacement, gravity, 
inertia, molecular movement, opacity, and phase change. For a full list of explanations, see Table 
1.  
 Participants either evaluated all nine biology items or all nine physics items. To ensure 
there were no systematic differences between participants in the two conditions, we randomly 
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assigned participants by alternating between the conditions. For each item, the experimenter 
presented a photo of a single animal or artifact in a naturalistic background (e.g., a bear in a 
meadow) and then stated an observation about that animal or artifact (e.g., “This bear looks like 
its parents”). After making this observation, the experimenter said, “Here are two explanations 
for this. Both are true. Which one do you think is most helpful?” We emphasized that both 
explanations were true in order to ensure participants were focusing on the scope of the 
explanations rather than their truth value. Additionally, we prefaced each of the two explanations 
with the phrase “Is it because…” in order to highlight the explanatory nature of the task. 
Each item had three potential levels of explanation—token (e.g., “This bear is made from 
a mixture of ingredients from its parents”), basic (“All bears…”), and superordinate (“All 
animals…”)—but participants were only presented with a subset of two of these explanations for 
each item. We chose to use universally quantified noun phrases (e.g., “All bears” rather than 
“bears”) to ensure that any domain differences were not driven by differences in participants’ 
inferences about the scope of the statements. To help reduce the memory load for young 
children, each explanation was presented along with an image that represented the level of 
explanation. See Figure 1 for sample images. 
 To determine which animal or artifact would be featured in each item, we developed a list 
of 9 basic level animal categories (i.e., bears, cats, fish, frogs, parrots, penguins, sharks, snakes, 
turtles) and 9 basic level artifact categories (i.e., balls, cars, chairs, cups, hats, planes, shirts, 
spoons, tables) and randomly assigned one basic level category to each item. The pairing 
between item and basic level category was kept consistent across participants. The order of the 
items, the subset of explanations presented for each item, and the order in which the explanations 
were presented within each item were counterbalanced. Most crucially, each participant received 
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each of the three explanation pairings (i.e., superordinate vs. basic; superordinate vs. token; basic 
vs. token) three times over the course of the study. 
Results 
 Our major results can be seen in Figures 2 and 3. As shown in these figures, children 
demonstrate an early-emerging preference for explanation generality in biology, but a later-
developing preference for explanation generality in physics. 
As a preliminary analysis, we investigated whether participants’ preferences for 
explanation varied as a function of age, domain, or explanation level. Specifically, we conducted 
a partially repeated-measures ANOVA. Age (5–7, 11–13, and adult) and domain (biology and 
physics) were between-subjects factors and explanation level (token, basic, superordinate) was a 
within-subjects factor. We found a significant effect of explanation level, F(2, 142) = 44.82, p < 
.001, η2 = .387, as well as interactions between explanation level and age, F(4, 286) = 3.24, p = 
.013, η2 = .043, explanation level and domain, F(2, 142) = 3.25, p = .042, η2 = .044, and 
explanation level, age, and domain, F(4, 286) = 2.13, p = .078, η2 = .029. Given that we found a 
marginally significant three-way interaction between explanation level, age, and domain, we 
analyzed the results for each domain and age group separately.  
Biology 
 To examine whether participants’ explanatory preferences varied as a function of 
explanation level in biology, we conducted post-hoc Bonferroni tests for each age group (with a 
corrected alpha level of .017) comparing participants’ preference for each explanation level. 
Participants in each age group preferred superordinate and basic level explanations more than 
token level explanations (ps < .007, ds > 0.74). However, neither the 5- to 7-year-olds, t(17) = 
1.38, p = .186, d = 0.32, nor the 11- to 13-year-olds, t(16) = 1.79, p = .092, d = 0.44, showed a 
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significant preference between the basic and superordinate level explanations, and adults only 
showed a marginally significant preference (compared to the corrected alpha level of .017) for 
superordinate level over basic level explanations, t(38) = 2.16, p = .037, d = 0.35. See Figure 2.  
Single sample t-tests comparing each of these levels to chance revealed that participants 
in all age groups preferred the superordinate level explanations significantly more than chance 
(ps < .013, ds > 0.65) and also preferred the token level explanations significantly less than 
chance (ps < .004, ds > 0.81). In fact, adults not only preferred the superordinate level 
explanations more than chance, but they also significantly preferred the basic level explanations 
more than chance, t(38) = 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.66. These results demonstrate that, although 
participants in all age groups typically preferred the most general explanations in biology, they 
showed some preference for basic level explanations as well. Specifically, children in both age 
groups showed similar overall preferences for superordinate and basic level explanations and 
adults even showed a significant preference for basic level explanations above and beyond their 
preference for explanation generality. 
 To provide additional clarification on our results, we also examined participants’ 
preferences within each explanation pairing separately (i.e., token vs. basic, token vs. 
superordinate, and basic vs. superordinate). For each pairing, we calculated the number of times 
(out of 3) participants chose the more general level. Single sample t-tests revealed that 
participants in all age groups preferred the basic level over the token level explanations in 
biology (ps < .005, ds > 0.80), and also preferred the superordinate level explanations over the 
basic level explanations (ps < .044, ds > 0.53). However, only the 11- to 13-year-olds and adults 
significantly preferred the superordinate level explanations over the token level explanations (ps 
EXPLANATION GENERALITY	 12 
< .004, ds > 0.86). See Figure 3. These results provide additional evidence that children and 
adults have a preference for explanation generality in biology.  
Physics 
 As in biology, we conducted post-hoc Bonferroni tests for each age group (with a 
corrected alpha level of .017). The 5- to 7-year-olds showed no significant difference in their 
preference between the three levels (ps > .205, ds < 0.53). In contrast, both 11- to 13-year-olds 
and adults preferred the superordinate level more than both the basic level (ps < .008, ds > 1.09) 
and the token level (ps < .001, ds > 1.98). Likewise, 11- to 13-year-olds, t(16) = 2.39, p = .029, d 
= 1.06, and adults, t(39) = 3.58, p = .001, d = 0.93, preferred the basic level more than the token 
level, though this preference was only marginally significant (p > .017) for the 11- to 13-year-
olds. See Figure 2. 
Single-sample t-tests comparing each of the three levels of explanation to chance 
revealed that 11- to 13-year-olds and adults preferred the superordinate level significantly more 
than chance (ps < .001, ds > 2.23), the basic level no differently from chance (ps > .140, ds < 
.49), and the token level significantly less than chance (ps < .003, ds > 1.81).  The 5- to 7-year-
olds showed no significant preference for any of the three levels (ps > .133, ds < 0.77). These 
results demonstrate that 11- to 13-year-olds and adults showed a consistent preference for the 
superordinate level explanation in physics, but 5- to 7-year-olds did not distinguish between the 
three levels of explanation in their preferences. 
As in biology, we also examined participants’ preferences within each explanation 
pairing separately (i.e., token vs. basic, token vs. superordinate, and basic vs. superordinate). 
Single sample t-tests revealed that 11- to 13-year-olds and adults showed a generality preference 
for each of the pairings (ps < .008, ds > 0.74). In contrast, 5- to 7-year-olds only showed a 
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significant preference for generality when comparing the token and basic levels, t(17) = 2.53, p = 
.022, d = 0.60. See Figure 3. Together, these results suggest that 11- to 13-year-olds and adults 
had a robust generality preference in physics that extended across each of the explanation 
pairings. In contrast, 5- to 7-year-olds only showed a preference for generality when the basic 
level was pitted against the token level and never showed a preference for the most general 
superordinate level. Taken together, our results suggest that 5- to 7-year-olds only show a secure 
grasp of explanation generality in biology: Although 5- to 7-year-olds preferred basic level 
explanations over token level explanations in both domains, they only preferred the most general 
superordinate explanations in biology. 
Discussion 
 A core function of explanation is to provide a useful platform for prediction and 
generalization. Our findings demonstrate that children are already beginning to recognize the 
utility of explanation generality by age 5. Regardless of whether children are asked to evaluate 
explanations in biology or physics, they prefer basic level explanations (e.g., that invoke “all 
hats”) over the more specific token level explanations that invoke a particular instance of a 
category (e.g., “this hat”). In fact, when evaluating explanations in biology, 5- to 7-year-olds are 
able to go a step further and indicate that superordinate explanations that invoke “all animals” 
are better explanations than those that invoke more narrow basic level categories (e.g., “all 
bears”). This quest for explanation generality is useful because it provides children with the 
opportunity to draw inferences across a wider range of situations and thus learn more efficiently. 
However, the preference for explanation generality remains somewhat tentative until later 
childhood. Although young children seem to prefer basic level explanations over token level 
explanations regardless of domain, their preference for the most general superordinate level 
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remains weak until after age 7. In physics, 5- to 7-year-olds never showed a preference for the 
superordinate level, regardless of whether it was contrasted with the token level or basic level, 
and in biology, 5- to 7-year-olds only preferred the superordinate level when it was contrasted 
with the basic level. Crucially, although 5- to 7-year-old children’s preference for the 
superordinate level was relatively weak in both domains, they only showed a significant 
preference for the most general superordinate level in biology. The different pattern of results for 
biology and physics suggests that children’s ability to recognize the utility of explanation 
generality depends on the explanatory domain.  
Although further work is needed, prior research provides some insight into what might be 
driving the developmental differences we see in children’s generality preferences across domain. 
In particular, young children may better understand the predictive power offered by general 
explanations in biology than in physics. From a very early age, children are already beginning to 
understand the predictive power of animal kinds. Before age 5, children have robust expectations 
that information about one member of an animal kind will extend to other members of the same 
kind (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987). Crucially, this expectation that information will 
apply widely across categories applies to the exact sort of biological principles we used in our 
study. For instance, when 3- and 4-year-olds learn that one type of bug breathes in air, they are 
likely to assume that another bug of a similar type will breathe in air as well (e.g., Gelman & 
Markman, 1986, 1987). Thus, even young children understand that animal kinds provide the 
basis for useful predictions about novel cases. 
One of the most useful aspects of general explanations is that they provide the basis for 
prediction across a wide range of cases. In the domain of biology, an explanation about all 
animals not only allows children to gain insight about “this bear,” but “this fish” as well. Given 
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that children have an early understanding of the predictive nature of animal kinds (e.g., Gelman 
& Markman, 1986, 1987), this may have bolstered their ability to recognize the utility of 
explanation generality in biology. If children understand that a general explanation about all 
animals allows future predictions about a wide variety of animals, then they should have an 
easier time recognizing its utility as an explanation. 
Although young children can rely on the predictive nature of animal kinds to infer the 
utility of general explanations in biology, they cannot rely on their understanding of non-living 
kinds to infer the utility of general explanations in physics. In contrast to animal kinds, which are 
in large part defined by the biological principles they share (e.g., respiration), physical kinds, 
especially the specialized artifacts humans create, are in a large part defined by the differences in 
how they function (e.g., what a child is taught about how to use a hammer may be completely 
unrelated to the proper way to use a knife). Even young children seem to be sensitive to this 
distinction between non-living kinds and animal kinds. Not only are young children less likely to 
provide generic statements for non-living kinds (e.g., hammers) than animal kinds (e.g., bears; 
Brandone & Gelman, 2013), but they are also less likely to assume that information about one 
member of a non-living kind will extend to another member of the same kind (Gelman, 1988). 
Thus, even young children recognize that non-living kinds are less predictive than animal kinds. 
Given that children cannot assume that information about one non-living kind is 
predictive of other members of that kind, the structure of the inference children need to make 
about explanation generality in physics is different than that of biology. To understand the utility 
of explanation generality in physics, children need to understand the predictive power of a set of 
external principles (e.g., gravity) that enact on all objects regardless of category membership. 
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Five- to 7-year-olds in our study may have struggled to recognize the utility of 
explanation generality in physics because they did not recognize the predictive nature of general 
physical principles. Until the age of 8, children often conceptualize physical forces as internal 
forces emitting from a particular object (Ionnides & Vosniadou, 2002). It is not until sometime 
between age 8 and 12, that children start to understand that forces are externally applied, rather 
than internally driven. Given that young children are hesitant to generalize information from one 
member of a non-living kind to another (e.g., Brandone & Gelman, 2013; Gelman, 1988), they 
may not recognize the predictive power of general physical principles until after age 8 when they 
begin to see them as generalize external forces, rather than forces that emit from individual 
objects. 
However, it is important to consider an alternate explanation for our developmental 
differences. We chose to use naturalistic stimuli in our study since prior work has suggested that 
young children may struggle when considering explanations for novel exemplars (e.g., Cimpian 
& Cadena, 2010; c.f., Cimpian & Markman, 2009). Although our naturalistic stimuli may have 
improved children’s performance in some respects, it also inevitably introduced potential 
discrepancies in children’s background knowledge. One account of the domain differences we 
see in the 5- to 7-year-old age group is that these young children may have been more familiar 
with the biological principles than the physical principles in our explanations, and thus better 
able to evaluate the biological explanations. Although 5- to 7-year-olds showed some distinction 
in their preference for the physical explanations (i.e., they preferred basic-level explanations over 
token-level explanations), they showed less distinction in their preferences in physics than they 
did in biology. Thus, is it possible that children’s familiarity with biological and physical 
principles influenced their explanatory preferences in some way. Future work should address this 
EXPLANATION GENERALITY	 17 
issue by examining children’s generality preferences for novel biological and physical 
explanations. 
Even young children appreciate explanation generality in some contexts, and crucially 
they never prefer specificity. However, children do not begin to consistently apply their 
preferences for explanation generality until after age 7. When explanations invoke highly 
predictive categories, such as animal kinds, even 5- to 7-year-olds prefer general explanations 
(e.g., about “all animals”) that license prediction across a wide range of token members (e.g., this 
bear, fish, snake, etc.). However, when explanations invoke categories that are less predictive, 
such as artifact kinds, children do not prefer general explanations (e.g., about “all things”) until 
after age 7, when they begin to appreciate the predictive power of external physical principles 
(e.g., gravity, inertia, etc.). Thus, it seems there is an early-emerging preference for explanation 
generality, and this preference is applied more broadly as children learn which explanations 
provide the most predictive power. 
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Concept Observation Explanation 
Circulation This parrot has blood running 
through its body. 
All animals have hearts that pump blood 
through their bodies. 
Digestion This cat gets energy from its food. All animals break food into tiny pieces 
to get energy. 
Hydration This penguin’s insides are in balance. All animals have water inside of them 
that keeps their insides in balance. 
Immunity This frog gets better after being sick. All animals have little fighters in their 
bodies that attack bad things that make 
them sick. 
Inheritance This bear looks like its parents. All animals are made from a mixture of 
ingredients from their parents. 
Movement This snake moves around. All animals have muscles that stretch 
and shrink to change the position of their 
bodies. 
Respiration This fish has oxygen in its body. All animals have organs in their body 
that pull in oxygen from their 
environment. 
Sight This turtle sees what’s in front of it. All animals have eyes that turn light into 
a picture. 
Waste This shark only keeps the parts of 
food that it needs. 
All animals go potty, which gets rid of 
the parts of food they don’t need. 
Atomic 
Structure 
This ball takes up space. All things are made of tiny parts that 
take up space. 
Color This chair has color. All things are the color of the part of the 
light they reflect. 
Decay This table slowly turns to dust over 
time. 
All things break down into smaller 
pieces and eventually the pieces become 
so small we can’t see them anymore. 
Displacement This hat can’t be in the same place as 
something else. 
All things take up their own space, so 
when another object tries to fill the same 
space, they push each other away. 
Gravity This plane is pulled toward the Earth. All things are pulled by Earth’s gravity. 
Inertia This cup stays in the same place. All things stay still until something 
moves them. 
Molecular 
Movement 
This spoon gets harder in the cold. All things have little pieces that hold 
together more closely when it is cold. 
Opacity This car leaves a shadow. All things leave a shadow when they 
keep light from passing through them. 
Phase 
Change 
This shirt turns to smoke in fire. All things turn to gas when they get 
really really hot. 
 
Table 1. Full list of observations and explanations. Biological items are above the solid black bar 
and physics items are below the solid black bar. For simplicity, we just present the superordinate 
explanations here that invoke “all animals” and “all things.” 
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(a)  (b)  
(c)  (d)  
(e)  (f)  
Figure 1. Sample images used for each level of explanation. Figures (a) and (b) represent the 
superordinate level explanation for biology and physics respectively. Figures (c) and (d) 
represent the basic level, and figures (e) and (f) represent the token level.  
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Figure 2. Mean number of times participants selected each explanation level (i.e., token level, 
basic level, and superordinate level) in biology and physics. Horizontal line demonstrates chance 
performance. Error bars represent standard error. 
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Figure 3. Mean number of times participants selected the more general level in each explanation 
pairing – token vs. basic (more general = basic), basic vs. superordinate (more general = 
superordinate), and token vs. superordinate (more general = superordinate) – in biology and 
physics. Horizontal line demonstrates chance performance. Error bars represent standard error. 
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